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Abstract
We study a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks. In our
model, boundedly rational agents update opinions by averaging over their neigh-
bors’ expressed opinions, but may misrepresent their own opinion by conforming or
counter-conforming with their neighbors. We show that an agent’s social influence
on the long-run group opinion is increasing in network centrality and decreasing
in conformity. For efficiency of information aggregation (“wisdom”), misrepresen-
tation of opinions need not undermine wisdom. Given the network, we provide
the optimal distribution of conformity levels in the society and show which agents
should be more conforming in order to increase wisdom.
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1 Introduction
Understanding opinions is important because they crucially shape economic behavior.
Consumers’ demand for a product depends on the opinions about the quality of this
product and about the integrity of its producing company. Majority opinions on political
issues set the political course. Moreover, opinions on the relative importance of issues
decide upon the agenda of actions or on the allocation of a budget – be it within a company,
within a government, or within some other group of decision makers. When asked for a
personal opinion, however, people are often tempted to misrepresent what they actually
think, e.g. because disagreement would make them feel uncomfortable. Abstracting from
this issue, models of opinion formation have worked with the assumption that people do
not misrepresent their opinions. They provide conditions for the emergence of consensus
of opinions (e.g. DeGroot, 1974), identify opinion leaders (e.g. DeMarzo et al., 2003),
and even show that large societies can be “wise” in a well defined sense (e.g. Golub
and Jackson, 2010). We challenge these results by incorporating the possibility that
stated opinions differ from true opinions in a conforming or counter-conforming way.
This requires additional conditions to guarantee consensus, it affects who is an opinion
leader, and it can undermine or foster the wisdom of a society, as we will show.
If individuals are fully rational and completely informed, then the social network (of
personal relationships) does not affect long-run opinions.1 However, in most settings it is
not realistic to assume that individuals know the whole social network which determines
the communication structure. Moreover, as it has been shown recently in laboratory ex-
periments, even in small social networks where the network is made common knowledge,
people fail to properly account for repetitions of information (Corazzini et al., 2012).
Therefore, models of more na¨ıve social learning are used to describe the process of opin-
ion formation (DeMarzo et al., 2003; Golub and Jackson, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2010;
Corazzini et al., 2012). The common idea of these approaches is to assume that agents
update their opinion according to a weighted average of the current opinions (cf. DeG-
root, 1974). In this so-called DeGroot model the weights of averaging are collected in an
exogenously given learning matrix, which has the interpretation of a social network.
While the assumption of this form of non-Bayesian updating has been extensively dis-
cussed and motivated (Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990; DeMarzo et al., 2003; Acemoglu and
Ozdaglar, 2011; Corazzini et al., 2012), this is not true to the same extent for another
crucial assumption of the DeGroot model framework: it is assumed that actors do not
misrepresent their opinion; in other words, stated opinions are assumed to coincide with
true opinions. DeMarzo et al. (2003) argue that this assumption is problematic in contexts
1Indeed, among equally informed agents within a strongly connected social network that is common
knowledge, Bayesian updating leads to convergence of all agents’ opinions to their initial opinions’ average
(DeMarzo et al., 2003, theorem 3).
of persuasion, where actors have a material interest in influencing others’ opinions. But
even if there is no material incentive to persuade, people often misrepresent their opin-
ions. In the famous study of Asch (1955), subjects wrongly judged the length of a stick
after some other, allegedly neutral, participants had placed the same wrong judgment.
Follow-up studies revealed that this effect is weaker if the subjects do not have to report
their judgments publicly (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). The authors argue that two forms
of social influence can be observed in this study. While informational social influence
describes the updating of opinions according to what others have said, normative social
influence describes the behavior of stating an opinion that fits to the group norm.2 Thus,
one motive to misrepresent the true opinion is a preference for conformity in the sense
of “getting a utility gain by simply making the same choice as one’s reference group”
(Zafar, 2011, p. 774). Incentives to conform can be derived from desires for social status
(Bernheim, 1994) and are embodied in a utility component that depends on the difference
of the behavior of the focal actor and the behavior of some peer group (Jones, 1984),
also called “reference group” (Hayakawa and Venieris, 1977). Meanwhile, the concepts
of informational and normative social influence have become a cornerstone in analyzing
social influence, e.g. Ariely and Levav (2000, p. 279) call it the “primary paradigm”.3 In
terms of this paradigm, the DeGroot model of opinion formation and its variations are
models of informational social influence, but not of normative social influence.
In this work, we present a model that incorporates both informational and normative
social influence. The model consists of a sequence of discussion rounds among na¨ıve and
boundedly rational agents. In each discussion round agents express an opinion depending
on their true opinion and on their preferences for conformity. We consider agents with
preferences for conformity, counter-conformity, and honest agents.4 From one discussion
round to the next, learning takes place in the sense that agents update their opinion
according to a learning matrix. In the special case where every agent is honest, our model
coincides with the classic DeGroot model studied by DeMarzo et al. (2003); Golub and
Jackson (2010); Corazzini et al. (2012). Allowing agents to misrepresent their opinion
in a conforming or counter-conforming way, we investigate how opinions evolve. We first
analyze the two-agent case which illustrates that dynamics can diverge, converge, or cycle.
2Deutsch and Gerard (1955, p. 629) further explain: “Commonly these two types of influence are
found together. However, it is possible to conform behaviorally with the expectations of others and say
things which one disbelieves but which agree with the beliefs of others. Also, it is possible that one will
accept an opponent’s beliefs as evidence about reality even though one has no motivation to agree with
him, per se.”
3However, this paradigm did not explicitly enter economic models. The terms ‘social influence’ and
‘conformity’ do usually not clarify whether social or normative influence is at work. We will be more
explicit on this distinction and only refer to conformity as a form of normative social influence.
4This is consistent with the psychological theory on normative social influence, which considers identi-
fication, non-identification and disidentification with the peer group as the sources of conformity, honesty
(independence), and counter-conformity (Hogg and Abrams, 1988).
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It turns out that a sufficiently conforming agent will reach consensus with any other agent.
We then show more generally that excluding counter-conforming agents is sufficient to
guarantee convergence of opinions to local consensus.
Focusing on convergence, we then ask how opinion leadership depends on conformity.
Understanding the determinants of opinion leadership is important because opinion lead-
ers have the potential to mislead others. In our model opinion leadership or power of any
agent can be measured by the influence of her initial opinion on the long-run (consensus)
opinion of her group. As one of the main results, we show how power is determined not
only by eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1972; Friedkin, 1991) with respect to the learn-
ing matrix, but also by the distribution of conformity in the society. Comparative statics
reveal that an agent’s power is decreasing in own level of conformity, increasing in other
agents’ level of conformity and increasing in own network centrality. These results show
that a strong position in the social network is not sufficient to become an opinion leader.
Another requirement is that an agent is not more conforming than the other members of
the society. Thus, our model provides a theoretical explanation for the empirical finding
that opinion leaders are characterized by a low degree of conformity (Chan and Misra,
1990).
Finally, we consider a context where there is a true state of nature and the individuals’
initial opinions are independent, unbiased, noisy signals which may differ with respect to
signal precision (the inverse of the variance). The question is how the misrepresentation
of opinions affects the accuracy of information aggregation (the society’s “wisdom”). A
negative effect might be expected since stated opinions become even less reliable signals
about the truth. Our results show that this conjecture does not hold in general. First,
if the society is homogeneous with respect to conformity, then information aggregation is
neither worse nor better than in the DeGroot model (i.e. when all individuals are honest).
Moreover, heterogeneous levels of conformity foster wisdom if they balance the power
of agents with their signal precision, while an unbalanced distribution can lead to lower
wisdom. Using comparative statics we observe that for the goal of higher accuracy of the
consensus opinion it would be helpful if people with a low signal precision (relative to
their power) were more conforming, while people with a high signal precision (relative to
their power) should be less conforming, or in more poetic words: “The whole problem
with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, but wiser
people so full of doubts.”5
5Credit for this quote is often given to the philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell. Although
the origin of the quote is actually unknown, it is at least confirmed that Russell made a similar statement
in his essay “The Triumph of Stupidity,” which can be found in Mortals and Others: Bertrand Russell’s
American Essays, 1931-1935.
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Related Models The non-Bayesian approach to learning in social networks roots in
the pioneer work of French (1956), Harary (1959), and DeGroot (1974). Friedkin and
Johnsen (1990) provide a framework that subsumes former models as special cases. A
particular feature of Friedkin and Johnsen (1990) is that opinions can be updated in
every period not only according to the current profile of opinions but also according to
the own initial opinion. Another variation of the classic model is to let agents only be
affected by opinions that are not too different from the own opinion (Hegselmann and
Krause, 2002). Moreover, Lorenz (2005) allows the learning matrix to vary over time
and identifies general conditions for convergence. Under some conditions, convergence
to consensus is also robust if updating is noisy, as Mueller-Frank (2011) shows. In the
seminal contribution of DeMarzo et al. (2003) self confidence is allowed to vary over time.
There are also studies which extend the model by DeGroot (1974) to allow for adaption of
learning weights, e.g. in Pan (2010) the influence weights are updated over time and Flache
and Torenvlied (2004) study a variation of the classic model where actors anticipate the
difference between own opinion and group decision and adapt learning weights accordingly.
The recent model by Foerster et al. (2013) studies agents who increase the learning weights
others have for them. In a context of cultural transmission of traits, Buechel et al. (2011)
introduce strategic interaction for the DeGroot model in an OLG framework.
Finally, Corazzini et al. (2012) assess real opinion updating in a laboratory experiment.
They reject the hypothesis that participants are fully Bayesian and conclude that the
network structure does matter, which is in line with DeMarzo et al. (2003) who assume
that agents do not properly account for repetition, but are subject to persuasion bias.
Corazzini et al. (2012) suggest a specification of the DeGroot model, which is also a special
case of our model.
In the context of binary opinions Condorcet’s Jury theorem is a famous example of
how aggregation of individual opinions can be efficient in the limit. In the framework of
the DeGroot model, a similar phenomenon, coined “the wisdom of crowds,” is studied.
Golub and Jackson (2010) provide conditions for wisdom in the sense that the consensus
opinion of a society comes arbitrarily close to the truth when letting the size of the
society grow. Our approach to assess efficiency of information aggregation differs in that
we analyze the accuracy of information aggregation for a society of fixed size. This is
in line with Acemoglu et al. (2010) who assess the wisdom of a society as the difference
between optimal information aggregation and the consensus opinion that emerges in their
model. However, similar to Golub and Jackson (2010) we find that na¨ıve agents can be
remarkably wise.
Besides these highly related works, there are several contributions to social influence in
the context of discrete choices of actions, such as the choice of one out of two technologies.
While their discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, we refer the reader to the following
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few prominent examples: models of social learning (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Ellison and
Fudenberg, 1993, 1995; Bala and Goyal, 1998, 2001), cooperative models of social influence
(Grabisch and Rusinowska, 2010, 2011), and a model of strategic influence (Galeotti and
Goyal, 2009). Moreover, there is a recent literature on communication in social networks
when agents are strategic (Hagenbach and Koessler, 2010; Anderlini et al., 2012; Ambrus
et al., 2013). Those models of strategic information transmission clearly apply to different
contexts than the models of na¨ıve social learning.
The rest of this paper is organized into five sections. In Section 2 we introduce the
model. Before we present the main results (in Section 4), we discuss the two-agent case
(Section 3). Section 5 addresses the wisdom of a society and in Section 6 we conclude,
while proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Informational Social Influence
There is a set of agents/players N = {1, 2, ..., n} who interact with each other. A learning
structure is given by a n × n row stochastic matrix G, i.e. gij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ N and∑n
j=1 gij = 1 for all i ∈ N . This learning matrix represents the extent to which agents
listen to other agents and it can be interpreted as a weighted and directed social network.
We say that there is a directed path from i to j in this network if there exists i0, ..., ik ∈ N
such that i0 = i and ik = j and gilil+1 > 0 for all l = 0, ..., k − 1, which is equivalent to
(Gk)ij > 0.
6 Moreover, we assume that gii < 1 for all i to assure that all agents update
their opinion.
We study a dynamic model where time is discrete t = 0, 1, 2... and initially each agent
has a predefined opinion xi(0) concerning some topic. The opinions of all agents at time
t are collected in x(t) ∈ Rn. In every period, agents talk to each other and finally update
their opinions according to the matrix G. In the classical DeGroot model agents exchange
opinions such that the opinions in period t+1 are formed by x(t+1) = Gx(t) = Gt+1x(0)
(DeGroot, 1974). The motivation for such a model is that agents always report their
true opinions and suffer from persuasion bias when the next period’s opinion is formed
as a weighted average of own and others’ opinions according to the social network G.
Concerning the assumption of honesty in opinion formation, DeMarzo et al. (2003) note:
“For simplicity, we assume that agents report their beliefs truthfully.”7
6We follow the convention of Jackson (2008) and DeMarzo et al. (2003) that a directed link from agent
i to agent j indicates that i listens to j, i.e. gij > 0, while the opposite convention is used by Corazzini
et al. (2012).
7DeMarzo et al. (2003, p. 3, footnote 9).
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We relax this assumption: an agent i ∈ N expresses some opinion si(t) ∈ R which need
not coincide with her true opinion xi(t).
8
A central assumption of our approach is that an agent cannot observe the true opinions
of the others but only their stated opinions. Since each agent knows her own true opinion
xi(t), we get that agent i
′s next period’s opinion is formed by xi(t + 1) = giixi(t) +∑
j 6=i gijsj(t), where the weights gij are the individual learning weights as in the classical
model by DeGroot (1974). This holds for all agents i ∈ N and, thus, the updating process
becomes
x(t+ 1) = Dx(t) + (G−D)s(t), (1)
where D is the n× n diagonal matrix containing the diagonal of G.
2.2 Normative Social Influence
Misrepresenting the own opinion (i.e. being dishonest) might cause discomfort (e.g. Fes-
tinger, 1957). However, there are various motives to misrepresent the own opinion. Not
only strategic considerations of persuasion play a role, but also personality traits or emo-
tional motives. There is ample evidence that many people feel discomfort from stating an
opinion that is different from their peer group’s opinion (e.g. Deutsch and Gerard, 1955).
While certainly many people feel this type of normative social influence, this need not
be true for all people – there are even some who prefer to state an opinion that is far
away from what others say.9 We focus on these two motives for the misrepresentation of
opinions: conformity and counter-conformity.
To formalize these ideas, consider an agent i who is confronted with some group opinion
qi, while her own opinion on this topic is xi. In the spirit of the model of Bernheim (1994)
we consider a utility function that depends on an intrinsic part – this will be the incentive
to be honest – and a social part – this will be the incentive to conform/counter-conform.
Additionally, we assume that utility of an agent is additively separable into these two
parts and that for each part disutility takes a quadratic form.
Thus, the utility of agent i depends on the distance of true opinion xi to stated opinion
si as well as on the distance of stated opinion si to group opinion qi in the following way:
ui(si|xi) := −(1− δi)
(
si − xi
)2 − δi(si − qi)2, (2)
8The incentive to state an opinion different from true opinion will be based on preferences for confor-
mity or counter-conformity (cf. Subection 2.2). Moreover, agents adapt their stated opinions faster than
true opinions such that s(t) is given by Proposition 1.
9For instance, Hornsey et al. (2003) conducted a laboratory experiment where subjects reported their
willingness to privately or publicly express and support their opinion. For subjects with a strong moral
basis on the topic, the treatment of suggesting that a majority of the other subjects disagreed slightly
increased the willingness to publicly express the opinion.
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where δi ∈ (−1,+1) displays the relative importance of the preference for conformity in
relation to the preference for honesty. The preference peak (or “bliss point,” Bernheim,
1994) for such an agent is given by si = (1−δi)xi(t)+δiqi(t). This assumption is illustrated
in Figure 1. For δi ∈ (0, 1) the agent faces a trade-off between conforming and being honest
such that her preference peak lies within the interval (xi, qi). For δi ∈ (−1, 0), a similar
trade-off can be seen counter-conforming and being honest. In that case the preference
peak lies within the interval (xi − (qi − xi), xi). We assume that δi > −1 to restrict
counter-conformity to a certain bound which seems weak enough to cover all reasonable
cases, but keeps the analysis tractable.
Figure 1: Preferences for conformity, counter-conformity, and honesty.
A stylized fact on normative social influence is that people are heterogeneous in the way
and their degree of being influenced. The degree of conformity can hence be considered a
personality trait, but it might also depend on the topic under discussion. Let ∆ denote
the n×n diagonal matrix with entries δi ∈ (−1, 1) on the diagonal representing the levels
of conformity in the society.
While updating of true opinions, i.e. learning, is a relatively slow cognitive process,
stated opinions can be adapted in a much more fluid way. Our model reflects this fact
by considering an adaption process of stated opinions which takes place within a time
period t, while true opinions are updated from one period to the next.10 Thus, suppose
that within each period t ∈ N, there is a fast time scale τ ∈ N such that at each time
step τ one or more agents speak. The (possibly random) set of agents who are selected
to state their opinions at time step τ (of period t) is denoted by Aτ (t). Let sτ (t) be the
vector of stated opinions. Agents who are not selected to revise keep the stated opinion
of the previous time step, i.e. sτi (t) = s
τ−1
i (t) if i ∈ N \Aτ (t). Agents, who are selected to
speak and thereby revise their stated opinion, observe last time step’s stated opinions of
their neighbors. These are perceived as a reference opinion qτ−1i (t), which is the average
of the stated opinions with weights according to the listening matrix G, i.e.
qτi (t) =
∑
j 6=i
gij
1− gii s
τ
j (t). (3)
10An interpretation for this assumption is that each period is a discussion round within which stated
opinions are adjusted, while learning takes place between discussion rounds.
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In line with our assumption that agents are na¨ıve when updating, we also assume that
agents are boundedly rational when revising their stated opinions. Upon revision oppor-
tunity, i.e. i ∈ Aτ (t), an agent i myopically chooses a stated opinion which maximizes her
current utility given by (2), i.e.
sτi (t) = (1− δi)xi(t) + δiqτ−1i (t), (4)
for any true opinion xi(t) and any reference opinion q
τ−1
i (t).
11 Hence, the stated opinion
given by myopic best response differs from the true opinion proportionally to the difference
of reference opinion and true opinion, and the proportion is determined by the preference
parameter δi. The parameter δi can thus be directly interpreted as the degree of conformity
of agent i′s behavior (cf. Figure 1). A conforming agent, characterized by δi ∈ (0, 1),
states an opinion between the true opinion xi(t) and perceived opinion q
τ−1
i (t). A counter-
conforming agent, characterized by δi ∈ (−1, 0), states an opinion that is more extreme
than the true opinion xi(t) (with respect to the perceived opinion q
τ−1
i (t)). Finally, an
honest agent, characterized by δi = 0, straight-forwardly states the true opinion, i.e.
sτi (t) = xi(t) for all τ ∈ N.
To ensure that every agent takes part in opinion exchange in period t, we assume that
for each agent i, the set {τ ∈ N : i ∈ Aτ (t)} is (almost surely) infinite, reflecting the
idea that no agent will stay forever with a stated opinion that is not in line with her
preferences. This assumption is satisfied if e.g. at each time step τ agents are randomly
selected to speak according to some probability distribution with full support on N .
It turns out that such a myopic best reply process within period t ∈ N inevitably leads
to one specific profile of stated opinions s(t) which only depends on the network G and
the conformity parameters ∆, but not on the starting stated opinions s0(t).
Proposition 1. Given the assumptions above, the within-period dynamics sτ (t) converge
for τ →∞ to
s(t) := [I −∆(I −D)−1(G−D)]−1(I −∆)x(t). (5)
The proof of Proposition 1 as well as all proofs of the following propositions are rele-
gated to an appendix. Proposition 1 shows that agents who revise opinions by conforming
or counter-conforming to what their neighbors last said, finally state (or express) the opin-
ions given by (5).
It is worth noting that considering the action sets Si(t) = R and utility functions
ui(si(t)|xi(t)) given by (2) implies that s(t) obtained by Proposition 1 is the unique Nash
equilibrium of the normal form game (N , S(t), u(·|x(t)) for each t ∈ N. Note that the
process that leads into this Nash equilibrium within period t neither requires complete
11Myopic maximizing is a common assumption in such models (see, e.g. Corazzini et al., 2012).
9
information (e.g. on the network structure G), nor high degrees of rationality, nor some
sort of common knowledge.
2.3 Model Summary
In our model each period t ∈ N can be viewed as a discussion round within which agents
express opinions and then learn from one discussion round to the next. Proposition 1
determines which opinions are finally stated in a given period as a function of the true
opinions x(t). These stated opinions s(t) determine the vector of reference opinions q(t)
by (3) and are then a crucial ingredient of the updating process.12 Since opinions of period
t+ 1 are formed by (1) and the stated opinions of each period can be calculated as in
Proposition 1, we conclude that the opinion profile in period t+ 1 depends on the opinion
profile in period t in the following way:
x(t+ 1) = Mx(t), (6)
where M :=
[
D+(G−D)[I−∆(I−D)−1(G−D)]−1(I−∆)
]
. Note that the transformation
from x(t) to x(t+1), i.e. the matrix M , is independent of x(t). Thus, the opinion dynamics
is fully described by the power series M t, since x(t + 1) = Mx(t) = M2x(t − 1) =
... = M t+1x(0).13 The relation to the classical DeGroot model becomes apparent in this
expression when recalling x(t+1) = Gx(t) = Gt+1x(0). In that light the misrepresentation
of opinions leads to a transformation of the matrix G into the matrix M . If every agent
is honest, i.e. δi = 0 for any i ∈ N , then M = G and, hence, we are back in the classical
case of DeGroot (1974).
Let us illustrate the model introduced above by an example with three agents.
Example 1. Suppose there are three agents. Player 1 (black) starts with an opinion
x1(0) = 0, Player 2 (red) and Player 3 (blue) have initial opinions of x2(0) = 50 and
x3(0) = 100. Player 2 is an honest agent, i.e. δ2 = 0, Player 3 is a conforming agent,
i.e. δ3 = .5 > 0, and Player 1 is a counter-conforming agent, i.e. δ1 = −.5 < 0. To
illustrate the implications of the different degrees of conformity, we let the players be in
a symmetric network position. In particular, let the interaction structure be given by
G =
.6 .2 .2.2 .6 .2
.2 .2 .6
 .
The dynamics of opinions across periods are displayed in Figure 2, where the solid lines
indicate the dynamics of true opinions x(t), the dashed lines display the stated opinions
12Since one interpretation for qi(t) is that this is the society’s opinion at time t as perceived by agent
i, we also call it i′s perceived opinion.
13The simple linear structure is of course implied by our assumption of quadratic utility.
10
s(t) at the end of each period, and the dotted lines the perceived opinions q(t). For better
readability, we abstract from within-period dynamics and simply connect the opinions at
time t and t+ 1 by straight lines.
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Figure 2: A three-agent example with one honest, one conforming, and one counter-
conforming agent.
Since Player 2 (red) is honest, her stated opinion will always be equal to her true
opinion. Therefore, those functions (red dashed line and red solid line) coincide. Player 3
is a conforming agent, she always expresses an opinion (dashed blue line) that is a convex
combination of the perceived opinion of others (blue dotted line) and her true opinion
(blue solid line). Player 1 is a counter-conforming agent. With respect to the perceived
opinion (black dotted line), she always expresses an opinion (black dashed line) that is
more extreme than her true opinion (black solid line).
The opinion dynamics in this simple example are such that stated, true, and perceived
opinions of each agent become more and more similar and approach the value 33.3 in the
long-run. Thus, the long-run opinions are closer to the initial opinion of the counter-
conforming Player 1 than to the initial opinion of the conforming Player 3. If every agent
was honest, i.e. (δi = 0, i = 1, 2, 3), opinions in this simple example would approach a
value of 50.
The dynamics of Example 1 highlights several features, the generality of which we
discuss in the subsequent sections.
11
3 Two-Agent Case
Let us begin with the analysis of the two-agent case. In this case, closed form solutions
are easy to obtain and, still, it is possible to observe several important properties of the
opinion dynamics. (The n-agent case is presented in Section 4.)
Let n = 2. Then we can write G as
G =
(
1− g12 g12
g21 1− g21
)
with g12, g21 ∈ (0, 1). With only two agents, the relevant group average for one agent is
simply the stated opinion of the other agent, i.e. q1(t) = s2(t) and q2(t) = s1(t). Plugging
in the variables for G into (6) yields
M =
(
1−m12 m12
m21 1−m21
)
=
1− g12
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2 g12
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2
g21
1− δ1
1− δ1δ2 1− g21
1− δ1
1− δ1δ2
 .
Since x(t+ 1) = Mx(t), an entry mij gives the importance of Player j on the one-period
opinion change of Player i. From ∂m12
∂δ2
= −g12 1−δ1(1−δ1δ2)2 , we see the following comparative
static effect: higher conformity of Player 2 reduces her one-period influence on Player 1
(m12), which vanishes (m12 → 0) when Player 2’s conformity approaches 1. Thus, in the
short run, conformity results in a reduction of influence. To investigate long-run effects,
we examine the power series M t since x(t) = M tx(0). By induction one can easily see
that M t can be rewritten as follows:
M t =
1
m12 +m21
(
m21 +m12(1−m12 −m21)t m12 −m12(1−m12 −m21)t
m21 −m21(1−m12 −m21)t m12 +m21(1−m12 −m21)t
)
. (7)
From (7), we observe that the decisive quantity for the (speed of) convergence of M t is
λ := 1−m12 −m21 = 1− g12(1− δ2) + g21(1− δ1)
1− δ1δ2 < 1,
which is the second (largest) eigenvalue of M (the other eigenvalue of M is always 1). In
particular, M t converges if |λ| < 1 and, moreover, the smaller |λ|, the higher the speed of
convergence. Before discussing the issue of convergence in more detail, let us have a brief
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look at the limit of M t in case of convergence: with the help of (7), we have
M∞ = lim
t→∞
M t =

m21
m12 +m21
m12
m12 +m21
m21
m12 +m21
m12
m12 +m21

such that, in the long run, the two agents will reach a consensus because x(∞) = M∞x(0).
Player 1’s and Player 2’s initial opinions enter this consensus opinion with weights m21
m12+m21
and m12
m12+m21
, respectively. Since m12
m12+m21
= g12(1−δ2)
g12(1−δ2)+g21(1−δ1) = 1 −
g21(1−δ1)
g12(1−δ2)+g21(1−δ1) ,
Player 2’s influence in the long-run is decreasing in δ2. Therefore, increasing conformity
not only decreases the short-run importance of an agent, but also the long-term impact
of this agent’s initial opinion.
To study the effect of conformity/counter-conformity on convergence, we will first
consider the special case δ1 = δ2 =: δ which simplifies λ to
λ = 1− 1
1 + δ
(g12 + g21).
14 (8)
Since λ < 1, the decisive thresholds for λ are λ = 0 and λ = −1: for λ = 0, convergence
will be fastest (one-step convergence due to M = M2 = ... = M∞), while λ = −1 marks
the case of cycling M t (M t will alternate between M1 = M3 = ... and M2 = M4 = ...).
Figure 3 exemplifies the corresponding dynamics for G =
(
0.6 0.4
0.2 0.8
)
and initial opinions
x(0) = (0, 100)′. Notice, in particular, that the speed of convergence of true opinions x(t)
is not monotone in δ: when δ decreases from 0.5 to −0.4, speed increases and eventually
reaches one-step convergence; however, further reducing δ first leads to slower, alternating
dynamics, cycling, and finally divergent behavior.15 It might be surprising that higher
levels of conformity can decrease the speed of convergence. The intuition for this effect
can be gained by comparing cases (a) and (b). Under conformity, i.e. in case (a), stated
opinions s(t) are closer to each other in the first time periods such that agents’ true
opinions x(t) are less swayed to the center compared with case (b) where agents are
honest.16
If we relax the assumption of equal conformity (δ1 = δ2), the necessary and sufficient
14λ and |λ| as a function of δ are depicted in part (0) of Figure 3.
15Another aspect that can be observed in Figure 3 is that, under convergence, i.e. in cases (a)-(e), the
dynamics converges to the same limit independently of δ. We will show later on that this observation is
not a coincidence and that it is induced by setting δ1 = δ2 = δ.
16Recall that agents know their own true opinion and are thus resistant against their own misrepresen-
tation.
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Figure 3: Seven cases of two-agent dynamics for δ1 = δ2 = δ. Solid lines represent true
opinions and dashed lines display stated opinions. (0) Shape of λ. (a) δ > 0, conformity.
(b) δ = 0, honesty. (c) −0.4 < δ < 0, smooth convergence under counter-conformity. (d)
δ = −0.4, one-step convergence. (e) δ < −0.4, alternating dynamics with convergence.
(f) δ = −0.7, alternating dynamics (λ = −1). (g) δ < −0.7, divergence.
condition for convergence of M t (λ > −1) is equivalent to
g12
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2 + g21
1− δ1
1− δ1δ2 < 2. (9)
To interpret this condition in terms of individual conformity parameters, let us distin-
guish two cases:17
(i) If δ2 ≤ 2g21+g12−22+g12 , then M t converges if and only if δ1 >
g12(1−δ2)+g21−2
g21−2δ2 .
(ii) If δ2 >
2g21+g12−2
2+g12
, then M t converges for any δ1 ∈ (−1,+1).
Thus, if Player 2 has a relatively low degree of conformity (case (i)), then Player 1 must be
17It can be checked that the threshold which defines the two cases is always in (−1, 13 ). Additionally,
given that (i) holds, the threshold for δ1 is below 1.
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sufficiently conforming in order to assure convergence. However, if Player 2’s conformity is
above some threshold, then we will have convergence for any conformity level of Player 1.
In fact, δ2 >
1
3
is sufficient for (ii) to hold. Since similar arguments can be made by
exchanging the players’ labels, in the two-agent case we always have convergence if there
is an agent with δi >
1
3
. Thus, a sufficiently conforming agent will reach consensus with
any other agent.
4 Opinion Dynamics
To study the dynamics of opinions of n agents, we first elaborate on the properties of
steady states and the relation of true, perceived, and stated opinion. We then provide
conditions for convergence of opinions and finally determine where opinions converge to.
We establish these necessary results in a general and formal way in Sections 4.1–4.4 before
we turn to the interpretation, in particular of the main result (Theorem 1), in Section 4.5.
4.1 Perceived, True, and Stated Opinions in Steady States
The dynamics of stated opinions s(t) can be derived from the dynamics of x(t) = M tx(0)
since Proposition 1 determines s(t) in dependence of x(t). Also, the dynamics of q(t)
are determined by s(t) since each perceived opinion qi(t) is exogenously defined as some
weighted average of s(t).
If it is the case that dynamics eventually settle down, we have x(t+ 1) = x(t), which
is equivalent to Mx(t) = x(t). In general, we define z ∈ Rn to be a steady state of the
opinion dynamics if Mz = z, i.e. if it is a (right-hand) eigenvector of M corresponding to
the eigenvalue 1. Considering the characteristic equation det(I −M) = 0, we can rewrite
its argument with use of (6) as follows:
I −M = [I − (G−D)∆(I −D)−1]−1 (I −G), (10)
as shown in the Appendix A.2. Proposition 2 uses this expression to clarify the relation
between perceived, stated, and true opinions in a steady state.
Proposition 2 (Steady States). 1. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) x is a steady state, i.e. Mx = x,
(b) Gx = x,
(c) perceived and true opinions coincide, i.e. q = x,
(d) perceived and stated opinions coincide, i.e. q = s.
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2. If s = x, then δi(Gx− x)i = 0 for all agents i ∈ N . If δi 6= 0 for all agents i ∈ N ,
then s = x implies that x is a steady state.
The equivalence between Mx = x and Gx = x should not be misinterpreted. It does
not mean that both dynamics M tx(0) and Gtx(0) converge to the same vector of opinions.
What this condition really means can best be seen when G is irreducible, i.e. every agent
interacts (at least indirectly) with everybody else. Then, since G is row stochastic, Gx = x
is equivalent to xi = xj for all i, j ∈ N . In this case, all those opinion profiles are steady
states of G, where every agent has the same opinion. We call this a consensus. Only
consensus opinions can then be “steady states of G” (i.e. Gx = x) in case of irreducibility
of G and hence of M . Thus, the opinion dynamics in our model (according to M) only
lead to steady states that are also steady states of the special case with δi = 0 for all i
(i.e. the classic DeGroot model), but they do in general not lead to the same vector of
opinions when starting with some vector x(0). Further, the equivalence between Mx = x
and Gx = x implies that the rows of M always sum up to 1. This is true since G is
row stochastic and hence G1 = 1 (where 1 is the vector of ones) and thus by the above
result M1 = 1. Note however that, in contrast to G, M may have negative entries or even
entries larger than 1.
Proposition 2 part 1 also shows that in a steady state true opinion, stated opinion
and perceived opinion of any agent agree (since x = q = s). This is only true in a steady
state. However, the fact that true opinion x and stated opinion s coincide is not sufficient
for a steady state. The reason is simply that an honest agent (δi = 0) always reports her
opinion truthfully no matter of being in a steady state or not. In Part 2, however, we
show that if agents are dishonest (δi 6= 0 for all i ∈ N ), then all opinions are reported
truthfully (x = s) only in a steady state.
In the following we study the long-run dynamics. Since x(t) = M tx(0) it is straight-
forward to see that the opinion dynamics x(t) converges to a steady state (for any given
initial opinion profile x(0)) if and only if M t converges. From Proposition 2 it follows
that in this case also q(t) and s(t) converge. Note that we may also have convergence
of opinions x(t) if M t diverges. This can be most easily seen if every agent starts with
the same opinion (i.e. xi(0) = xj(0) for all i, j ∈ N ). Then from Proposition 2 we get
one-step convergence of x(t). This may also happen in the classical DeGroot model, i.e.
such that δi = 0 for all i.
18 However, in any case – whether or not M t converges – it
is possible to show that in our model the true opinions x(t) converge if and only if the
stated opinions s(t) converge, which is equivalent to convergence of perceived opinions q(t)
(see Appendix A.3, Lemma A.2). Moreover, all converge to the same limit. Therefore,
throughout the paper, we restrict our analysis to the dynamics of true opinions x(t).
18See Berger (1981) for a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of opinions in the DeGroot
model.
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4.2 The Structure of the Society
While some of the intuition gained in the two-agent case will generalize, there are features
of larger networks that cannot appear between only two agents: in the two-agent case,
both agents necessarily interact with one another since we assume that gii < 1 for all
i ∈ N . When considering opinion dynamics with n agents, there can be agents who are
not influenced at all by one another, or where the influence is only one-way. We thus
consider a partition of the agent set N such that the agents are ordered into groups which
are determined by the interaction patterns, i.e. the paths in the network implied by G.
Definition 1. Let Π(N , G) = {C1, C2, ..., CK ,R} be a partition of N into K(≥ 1) groups
and the (possibly empty) rest of the world R such that:
• Each group Ck is strongly connected, i.e. ∀i, j ∈ Ck there exists l ∈ N such that
(Gl)ij > 0.
• Each group Ck is closed, i.e. ∀i ∈ Ck, Gij > 0 implies j ∈ Ck.
• The (possibly empty) rest of the world consists of the agents who do not belong to
any group, i.e. R = N \
K⋃
k=1
Ck.
With a suitable renumeration, the matrix G can be organized into blocks which cor-
respond to the groups of the partition Π(N , G):
G =

G11 0 · · · · · · 0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 GKK 0
GR1 · · · · · · GRK GRR

(11)
with Gkk = G|Ck , GRR = G|R, and GRk consisting of the rows of G belonging to R and
the columns of G belonging to Ck. This kind of organizing the agents into groups and
organizing the matrix into blocks is standard in the literature based on the DeGroot model
(e.g. DeMarzo et al., 2003; Golub and Jackson, 2010). Proposition 3 explicitly shows that
M – and in fact M t, for all t ∈ N – has the same block structure as G.19 Moreover, it
characterizes M t.
Proposition 3 (Blocks). Let G be given as in (11), i.e. organized into blocks according
19This result is not self-evident. It crucially depends on the definition of the reference opinion qτi (t).
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to the partition Π(N , G) = {C1, C2, ..., CK ,R}. Then for every t = 1, 2, ... we have
M t =

M t11 0 · · · · · · 0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 M tKK 0
(M t)R1 · · · · · · (M t)RK M tRR

with
M tkk = [I −
(
I − (Gkk −Dkk)∆kk(I −Dkk)−1
)−1
(I −Gkk)]t
for all k = 1, . . . , K,R, and
(M t)Rk =
t−1∑
l=0
M lRRMRkM
t−1−l
kk ,
where MRk = (I − (GRR − DRR)∆RR(I − DRR)−1)−1GRk[(I − ∆kk(I − Dkk)−1(Gkk −
Dkk))
−1(I −∆kk)] for all k = 1, . . . , K.
Concerning the block structure of M t and considering that x(t) = M tx(0), Proposi-
tion 3 shows that the opinion dynamics of each group Ck can be studied independently.
Only for agents in R multiple groups may matter. The agents in R, on the other hand, do
not affect the dynamics within groups. More importantly, Proposition 3 provides an ex-
plicit expression for M t and thus for the sequence of true opinions (since x(t) = M tx(0)).
Let us now investigate the limit of this sequence.
4.3 Conditions for Convergence
From Proposition 3 it becomes apparent that the dynamics of the different closed and
strongly connected groups are independent. Therefore, it is necessary for convergence of
M t that for any group Ck the relevant block M tkk converges for t → ∞. To see that this
is not sufficient, consider the following example.
Example 2. Suppose there are four agents such that G =

0.7 0.3 0 0
0.3 0.7 0 0
0.085 0.085 0.49 0.34
0.085 0.085 0.34 0.49
 .
Thus Players 1 and 2 form a closed and strongly connected group C1, while Players 3
and 4 are the rest of the world R. Let the conformity parameter δ be given by δ =
(0, 0, δROTW , δROTW ). Figure 4 shows the opinion dynamics for the cases δROTW = −.75
and δROTW = −.9. While convergence within the closed and strongly connected group is
18
guaranteed, the rest of the world (ROTW) may cause divergence of M t for t→∞.20
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Figure 4: The opinion dynamics of Example 2 for (a) δROTW = −.75 and (b) δROTW = −.9.
Thus, convergence of all closed and strongly connected groups M tkk is not sufficient for
convergence of M t. In Proposition 4, we identify the additional condition on the rest of
the world such that M t converges.
Proposition 4 (First convergence result). Let the block structure of M be given as in
Proposition 3. M t converges for t→∞ if and only if M tkk converges for all k = 1, . . . , K
and M tRR converges to 0.
Proposition 4 presents a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of M in
terms of the block structure. In Example 2 the condition that MRR converges to 0 fails
since strong counter-conformity of two agents leads to eigenvalues with high absolute
value to the extent that |λRR| > 1, for some eigenvalue of MRR. A similar violation of the
necessary condition for convergence occurs if counter-conformity of agents in the closed
and strongly connected groups is too strong. Thus, one can derive the intuition that strong
counter-conformity may cause divergence. The following result presents simple conditions
on the degree of conformity and the interaction structure that ensure convergence of the
opinion dynamics.
20Notice that, for the latter case, M not only has negative entries but also entries larger than unity:
M =

0.7 0.3 0 0
0.3 0.7 0 0
0.053125 0.053125 −0.115625 1.009375
0.053125 0.053125 1.009375 −0.115625
 .
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Proposition 5 (Second convergence result). M t converges for t→∞ if ∀i ∈ N we have
gii > 0 and δi ≥ 0.
The condition presented here is fairly weak. If we exclude counter-conformity (δi ≥
0), and every individual has at least some self-confidence, then the opinion dynamics
converges. Although all cases of conformity are covered by Proposition 5, it is important to
emphasize that this condition is not necessary for convergence. Examples of convergence
which include counter-conforming agents are given in Examples 1, 2 and in Section 3.
4.4 Long-run Opinions
For the remainder, we now assume that the power series M t converges. Although confor-
mity is sufficient for convergence, we do not explicitly assume this.
We are now left to address where opinions converge to (in the long-run) when starting
with some opinion profile x(0). The answer to this question depends on the learning matrix
G and the conformity parameters δi. We are particularly interested in the influence of each
agent’s initial opinion on the long-run opinion given her network position and her degree of
conformity. The following result characterizes the long-run opinions explicitly (conditional
on convergence). We present it first in a formal way and turn to its interpretation in
Section 4.5.
Theorem 1. Let G and M be organized as in Proposition 3. We denote by w, v ∈ Rn
the vectors that fulfill the following: for each closed and strongly connected group Ck ∈
Π(N , G), w|Ck is the left unit eigenvector of Gkk with
∑
i∈Ck
wi = 1, while v|Ck is left unit
eigenvector of Mkk with
∑
i∈Ck
wi = 1. If M
t converges for t → ∞ to some matrix M∞,
then the following holds:
M∞ =

M∞11 0 · · · · · · 0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 M∞KK 0
M∞R1 · · · · · · M∞RK 0

with
M∞kk = 1|Ckv
′
|Ck = 1|Ckw
′
|Ck
I −∆kk
1
′
|Ck(I −∆kk)w|Ck
, (12)
and
M∞Rk = (I −GRR)−1GRkM∞kk (13)
for all k = 1, . . . , K.
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Theorem 1, the proof of which can be found in Appendix A.6, fully characterizes the
long-run dynamics of (true) opinions given convergence since x(∞) = M∞x(0).21 For
the interpretation of the result, we distinguish again between the closed and strongly
connected groups Ck and the rest of the world R.
We can first observe that the long-run opinions may differ across groups, but each
closed and strongly connected group Ck reaches a consensus ck ∈ R as each block M tkk
of M t converges to a matrix of rank 1. Each row of M∞kk is given by the left-hand unit
eigenvector v′|Ck , implying
ck := xi(∞) = xj(∞) = v′|Ckx(0)|Ck (14)
for all agents i, j in group Ck. The left-hand normalized unit eigenvector v′|Ck thus displays
the extent to which the initial opinion of each agent i matters for consensus within group
Ck. Moreover, v′|Ck is a function of w′|CK , the left-hand unit eigenvector of Gkk, and the
conformity parameters within the group, ∆kk. We delay the interpretation of this result
and its comparative statics to the next subsection.
The long-run opinion of an agent in the ROTW R is simply some weighted average
of the long-run opinions c1, . . . , cK within the groups 1, ..., K.
22 To see this, consider the
matrix
Γ := (I −GRR)−1(GR11|C1 , . . . , GRK1|CK ),
which is easily seen to be row-stochastic. Γ enables translating (13) into
x(∞)|R = Γc (15)
combining the long-run opinions of the closed and strongly connected groups denoted by
the K-dimensional vector c = (c1, . . ., cK)
′. Thus, the initial opinion of some agent in
the ROTW does not affect the long-run opinion profile x(∞) since the ROTW agents
end up with a weighted average of the consensus opinions of the closed and strongly
connected groups, which in turn are dependent on the initial opinions within those groups.
Moreover, the weights of averaging depend on G but not on the conformity parameters δi
for i ∈ R. Consequently, the long-run opinion of an agent in the ROTW neither depends
on an initial opinion nor on the conformity parameter of any agent within the ROTW
(including herself). Since each agent in the ROTW may average differently between
consent opinions of the closed and strongly connected groups, the agents in the ROTW
need not reach a consensus if there is more than just one closed and strongly connected
group. The important contribution of Theorem 1 lies in the characterization of v as a
21The dynamics collapses to the well-known DeGroot dynamics if every agent i is honest, i.e. ∆ is a
matrix of zeros.
22This result is fully analogous to theorem 10 in DeMarzo et al. (2003).
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function of w and ∆, as we will discuss next.
4.5 Opinion Leadership
To simplify the discussion, let us now restrict attention to one closed and strongly con-
nected group by assuming that there is only one such group, i.e. Π(N , G) = N . For
this purpose it is sufficient to assume that G is strongly connected or, equivalently, that
rk(I −G) = n− 1.
From (14), we get that x(∞) = 1v′x(0) and hence xj(∞) = v′x(0) =
∑
i∈N vixi(0).
Thus, an entry vi of v determines the weight of the initial opinion of agent i on the
long-run consensus opinion of her group. This is a very intuitive formalization of opinion
leadership: v measures the power of each agent in the group.
Note that for δi = 0 for all i ∈ N , (12) yields v = w, i.e. opinion leadership is fully
determined by the unit eigenvector of G. w is a well-studied object in network science:
it is known as eigenvector centrality of the transposed social network G′ (Bonacich, 1972;
Friedkin, 1991).23
When relaxing the assumption that every agent is honest, then the following Corol-
lary of Theorem 1 shows how opinion leadership is not only determined by eigenvector
centrality, but also by the degree of conformity.
Corollary 1. Let rk(I − G) = n − 1. Let w and v be the normalized left-hand unit
eigenvectors of G and M , respectively. Then we have for any i ∈ N
vi =
(1− δi)wi∑
j∈N (1− δj)wj
. (16)
Moreover,
∂vi
∂δk
=
wk
n∑
j=1
wj(1− δj)
 wi(1− δi)n∑
j=1
wj(1− δj)
− 1i=k
 = wkn∑
j=1
wj(1− δj)
(vi − 1i=k) . (17)
As it becomes apparent from (16) opinion leadership (power) vi of some agent i is
determined by the combination of her network centrality in G (wi) and the individual
conformity δi divided by the sum of these values over all agents. Thus, there is a com-
plementary relationship between network centrality and 1 − δi: power becomes minimal
(vi → 0) if either i’s network centrality approaches zero or if i is fully conform (δi → 1).
Taking the network G as given, we can observe the comparative statics with respect
23This index of centrality in a social network is recurrently defined via the rows of G′ (i.e. via the
columns of G): An agent’s centrality is the weighted sum of centralities of the agents who listen to her.
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to δi. From (17) we get for all i ∈ N that opinion leadership is decreasing in “own”
conformity δi and increasing in other agents’ conformity δk, k 6= i, since wj ∈ [0, 1] and
1−δj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N . Thus, low own conformity fosters opinion leadership. The same is
true if other agents are more conforming. We also may use (17) to examine which agent’s
power changes most in response to a marginal increase in her own conformity. From (17),
we calculate that∣∣∣∣∂vi∂δi
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∣∂vj∂δj
∣∣∣∣ ⇔ w2j (1− δj)− w2i (1− δi) < (wj − wi) n∑
k=1
wk(1− δk). (18)
Thus, if two agents have the same network centrality wi = wj, then by (18),
∣∣∣∂vi∂δi ∣∣∣ <∣∣∣∂vj∂δj ∣∣∣ if and only if δi < δj. In other words, the agent with the already higher degree
of conformity and thus lower power loses even more power in response to a marginal
increase in conformity compared with an agent with low conformity. Holding δi = δj,
we get
∣∣∣∂vi∂δi ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∂vj∂δj ∣∣∣ if and only if wi < wj, which implies that for two agents with equal
conformity the agent with the higher network centrality loses more power when increasing
own conformity.
We can also use Corollary 1 to compare opinion leadership in our model, v, with
opinion leadership in the classic DeGroot model, w, (i.e. with the special case of our
model where every agent i is honest, δi = 0). For this purpose consider first a society
where all agents are characterized by the same trait, i.e. δj = δ¯ for all j ∈ N . Then
(16) yields v = w: opinion leadership is not affected by conformity when all agents are
characterized by the same level of conformity. More generally, we have vi ≥ wi if and only
if δi ≤
∑
j 6=i
wj∑
k 6=i wk
δj, i.e. an agent’s power in our model compared to the classic DeGroot
model is fostered if δi is below some average of the others’ conformity parameters. This
is illustrated in Figure 5 which depicts vi as a function of δi for two different cases.
(a) Here we reconsider the learning matrix G as given in Example 1 with δ1 = −0.5,
δ3 = 0.5, and study the effect of Player 2’s conformity level δ2 on her power v2. If
Player 2 is honest, her initial opinion’s impact on the long-run consensus is 1/3, it
completely vanishes for Player 2’s conformity level approaching 1, while counter-
conformity allows Player 2 to become more important, eventually approaching v2 =
0.5 when δ2 approaches −1.24
(b) Here we reconsider Example 2 with δ1 = −0.7: in this case, Player 2’s ability to gain
power is further bounded by the fact that too strong counter-conformity (δ2 ≤ −0.7)
leads to divergence of opinions.
24One can show that the power gain by counter-conforming is bounded by vi(δi) ≤ (2− wi)vi(0).
23
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
δi
v i
(δ i)
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
δi
v i
(δ i)
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
di
ve
rg
en
ce
convergence
Figure 5: Power as a function of own conformity level.
5 Wisdom
The discussion so far applies to any continuous opinion including those for which no true
value can be determined. In some applications, however, agents’ opinions are more or less
accurate with respect to some objective truth. As in the discrete context of Condorcet’s
Jury theorem, the question whether agents aggregate information in an efficient way is
also of interest in the context of continuous opinions (Golub and Jackson, 2010; Acemoglu
et al., 2010).
Therefore we assume that there is some true value µ ∈ R and that all agents of
the society receive independent unbiased signals about µ with individual precision (i.e.
inverse of the variance) which constitute the agents’ initial opinions. Formally, for all
i ∈ N , agent i’s initial opinion xi(0) is a random variable with expected value µ and some
individual variance σ2i , and all xi(0) are uncorrelated random variables. Assuming that
opinion dynamics converge, a very natural question to ask is how close the different steady
state opinions will be to the true, but to the agents unknown, value µ.25 To measure this
difference between µ and an estimate µˆ, we use the mean squared error (MSE), which is
defined as E((µˆ−µ)2).26 The MSE can be decomposed into the squared bias (E(µˆ−µ))2
and the estimator’s variance Var(µˆ):
E((µˆ− µ)2) = (E(µˆ− µ))2 + Var(µˆ).
As x(∞) = M∞x(0) and M∞1 = 1, it is obvious that E(x(∞)) = µ1, i.e. all agents’
long-run opinions are unbiased estimates for µ. Denoting by Σ the covariance matrix
of x(0), the corresponding MSEs are therefore given by the entries on the diagonal of
25Recall that in a steady state true opinions and stated opinions coincide and there is consensus within
groups.
26The mean squared error as a measure of wisdom has also been used by Rauhut and Lorenz (2010).
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M∞Σ(M∞)′. To study the effects of conformity on wisdom, we begin with an illustrative
example.
5.1 Wisdom: an Example
Let n = 10, (σ21, . . . , σ
2
10)=(6, 4, 8, 7, 6, 3, 10, 12, 14, 16), and
G =

0.9 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.3 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.7 0.3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.3 0.7 0 0 0 0
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.9 0 0 0
0 0 0.2 0.3 0 0 0 0.5 0 0
0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.8 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.2 0.6

.
In this situation, we have K = 3 closed and strongly connected groups, C1 = {1, 2},
C2 = {3, 4}, and C3 = {5, 6}, while Players 7 to 10 form the rest of the world. If all agents
report their opinions truthfully (∆ = 0), we find the MSEs equal to (4, 4, 4, 4, 2.25, 2.25,
4, 4, 2, 1.0625). There are several notable features of this observation. First, due to the
fact that their long-run opinions are equal, all agents within a given closed and strongly
connected group share the same level of wisdom. Comparing the first two groups, we note
that the MSEs of these two groups are 4 each, although the first group enjoys significantly
better initial signals (of variances 6 and 4), while the second group seems to combine their
less precise signals (of variances 8 and 7) much more effectively. It is also remarkable that
Player 2, by communicating with Player 1, ends up with exactly the same MSE of 4 that
she would reach if she used only her own signal. With respect to the rest of the world,
notice that these agents typically have different MSEs. Furthermore, Players 7 and 8 each
end up with the same MSE as the first two groups, while Players 9 and 10 achieve MSEs
better than all members of the closed and strongly connected groups.
Now suppose that Players 2, 3, and 5 are conforming with δ2 = 5/9, δ3 = 2/3, and
δ5 = 1/2 (and δi = 0 for all other players). Then wisdom levels can be calculated to be
(4.9, 4.9, 4, 4, 2, 2, 4.9, 4, 2.225, 1.05625). Thus, increasing conformity can lead to a
decrease in wisdom (as the first group’s MSE becomes larger), the same wisdom (as the
second group’s MSE does not change), or an increase in wisdom (as the third group’s
MSE becomes smaller). We also find that the agents in the rest of the world are affected
by the changes in conformity of the agents in the closed and strongly connected groups:
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the MSE of Players 7 and 9 increases, while Player 10’s MSE decreases slightly. It still
holds that Player 7 and 8’s MSEs equal that of the first and second group, respectively.
We will now proceed by systematically analyzing the principles underlying the distri-
bution of wisdom within the society.
5.2 Wisdom of Groups
Due to (14), a group Ck will, given convergence, eventually end up reaching a consensus
where all agents’ opinions are equal to ck = v
′
|Ckx(0)|Ck =: µˆk. Hence, we can directly
derive group Ck’s wisdom as the MSE of µˆk.
Lemma 1. The MSE of µˆk is given by
MSEk := E((µˆk − µ)2) =
∑
i∈Ck
v2i σ
2
i =
∑
i∈Ck
 (1− δi)wi∑
j∈Ck
(1− δj)wj

2
σ2i .
We may use Lemma 1 to identify the individual contributions to the MSE in a given
group Ck. First, from Lemma 1 it follows directly that
MSEk =
∑
i∈Ck
v2i σ
2
i ≤
∑
i∈Ck
viσ
2
i ≤ max
i∈Ck
σ2i , (19)
since v2i ≤ vi due to vi ∈ (0, 1] for all agents i. Thus, group Ck’s long-run opinion is on
average at least as close to the true value µ as that of the agent with the least precise
signal. This worst case is given when both inequalities in (19) become equalities, which
is the case for vi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ Ck (first inequality) and vi = 0 for all i with
σ2i < max
j∈Ck
σ2j (second inequality). Therefore, information updating within group Ck is
worst when importance is given to only one agent whose signal is most imprecise. This
case would be approached if all other agents were close to full conformity, i.e. δi close to
1. We now consider the comparative static effect of one agent’s conformity on the wisdom
of her group.
Proposition 6. The wisdom of a closed and strongly connected group Ck is increasing in
the conformity level of a group member i if and only if i′s product of signal variance and
power is larger than the group’s MSE, i.e.
∂MSEk
∂δi
≤ 0 ⇔ viσ2i ≥ MSEk .
To give an interpretation for Proposition 6, let us rewrite viσ
2
i =
vi
1/σ2i
and MSEk =∑
j∈Ck
vj
vj
1/σ2j
. This shows that it is not a person’s expertise alone which is decisive for the
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question of how this person can increase the group’s wisdom, rather, it is the ratio of power
over signal precision, vi
1/σ2i
: if agents with a high ratio as compared to the group’s average
are more conforming, then this will reduce their power within the group, decrease the
group’s MSE, and thereby increase its wisdom. Vice versa, agents who are not powerful
enough in relation to their signal precision will increase the group’s wisdom if they are
less conforming, because this will increase their power, decrease the group’s MSE, and
foster its wisdom.27
The above discussion implies that in the best possible case, the ratio of power over
signal precision is constant within a group: viσ
2
i = vjσ
2
j for all i, j ∈ Ck. This is formalized
in the following corollary of Proposition 6.
Corollary 2. For the wisdom of group Ck as measured by MSEk, we have
MSEk ≥ 1∑
j∈Ck
1
σ2j
=: MSE∗k, (20)
with equality in (20) if and only if viσ
2
i = vjσ
2
j for all i, j ∈ Ck. The latter condition is
equivalent to
δi = 1− a 1
σ2iwi
∑
j∈Ck
1
σ2j
for all i ∈ Ck (21)
for some constant a ∈ (0, 2 ∑
j∈Ck
1
σ2j
min
j∈Ck
wjσ
2
j ).
Corollary 2 delivers the analogue to (19). While (19) describes the worst case with
respect to wisdom, Corollary 2 considers the best scenario: all agents within the same
closed and strongly connected group share the same ratio of power over signal precision,
and this case can always be constructed if the agents’ conformity is distributed suitably.
In particular, choosing a ∈ (0, ∑
j∈Ck
1
σ2j
min
j∈Ck
wjσ
2
j ] in (21) ensures δi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ Ck
and therefore by Proposition 5 guarantees convergence of the opinions in Ck to the best
possible consensus µˆk. Notice also that the optimal MSE is smaller than individual signal
variance σ2i for all agents i in group Ck, as is easily seen from (20). Therefore, under
optimal conformity all agents within Ck benefit from communication.
Reconsidering the example discussed in Subsection 5.1, we find the network centralities
(the left-hand unit eigenvectors of G) to be w1 = 0.8, w2 = 0.2, w3 = 0.6, w4 = 0.4,
w5 = 0.5, and w6 = 0.4. Therefore, in (21) the constant a can be chosen in (0, 2/3)
(group 1) and (0, 3/2) (groups 2 and 3). Choosing a = 1/3 (group 1) and a = 3/4 (groups
2 and 3) delivers δ1 = 5/6, δ3 = 5/12, and δ5 = 1/2 (and δi = 0 for all other agents).
Thus, choosing the agents’ degrees of conformity according to these values ensures the
27An analogous discussion can be already found in DeMarzo et al. (2003) for the case where agents are
honest.
27
optimal wisdom within the respective groups, given by (2.4, 2.4, 3.73, 3.73, 2, 2, 2.4,
3.73, 1.53, 0.883). The same level could also be reached for other conformity levels, for
instance, choosing a = 1/4 (first group), a = 3/7 (second group), and a = 3/8 (third
group) in (21), we find that the conformity levels δ1:6 = (7/8, 1/4, 2/3, 3/7, 3/4, 1/2)
also lead to the optimal wisdom. Notice that, as in Golub and Jackson (2010), wisdom
thus is independent of the speed of convergence, as we have two examples with the same
optimal wisdom but different speeds of convergence (the last-mentioned conformity levels
lead to slightly slower convergence than the earlier mentioned ones).
5.3 Wisdom within the Rest of the World
Let us recall that agents in the rest of the world do not necessarily share a consensus
opinion in the long-run, so that we will typically have individual wisdom levels. Due
to (15), we have the following formula for the long-run opinions within the rest of the
world: x(∞)|R = Γµˆ, with µˆ := (µˆ1, . . . , µˆK)′. Therefore, the wisdom levels in the rest
of the world depend on the conformity levels of the agents in the closed and strongly
connected groups as these affect the consensus opinions µˆk of these groups. On the other
hand, as neither the initial signals nor the conformity levels of the agents in the rest of
the world play any role for their long-run opinions, these agents’ wisdom is independent
of their conformity levels as well as of their initial signals. In other words, if the rest
of the world is non-empty, information processing in the society is necessarily inefficient
as the information contained in these agents’ initial signals is inevitably lost. Assuming
convergence, let γi,k denote the long-term weight of the group Ck on the opinion of agent
i ∈ R, i.e. xi(∞) =
K∑
k=1
γi,kµˆk (cf. (15)). This immediately translates into the wisdom of
an agent i ∈ R as follows:
E((xi(∞)− µ)2) =
K∑
k=1
γ2i,k MSEk ≤ max
k=1,...,K
MSEk . (22)
The wisdom of an agent in the rest of the world depends on the wisdom within the closed
and strongly connected groups. More precisely, an agent i’s wisdom only depends on the
wisdom of groups Ck to which there is a directed path in the network G because this
corresponds to γi,k > 0. The worst case for an agent in the rest of the world is to be
influenced only by agents of one closed and strongly connected group with maximal MSE.
With regard to the example discussed in subsection 5.1 this is the case for Players 7 and 8
who have directed paths only into group 1 and group 2, respectively, such that they share
their MSEs of 4. Player 9, however, who has directed paths into both groups with MSE of
4 reaches an MSE of 2 since the long-term weights γ9,1 = 0.5 and γ9,2 = 0.5 are squared in
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(22). Finally, Player 10 has directed paths into these groups via Player 9 and, moreover,
has a directed path into group 3. Player 10 therefore is able to combine MSEs of 4, 4, and
2.25 into an MSE as low as 1.0625. It is intuitive that for maximal wisdom of an agent in
the rest of the world, all groups’ signals have to be accessed with some kind of balanced
group weights. The following proposition confirms this intuition.
Proposition 7. For agents i ∈ R, we have:
E((xi(∞)− µ)2) ≥ 1K∑
k=1
1
MSEk
, (23)
with equality if and only if γi,k =
1
MSEk
K∑
l=1
1
MSEl
for all k = 1, . . . , K.
Therefore, the highest wisdom is achieved if an agent in the rest of the world averages
the different groups’ opinions in such a way that the product of weight put on a group
and its MSE is constant for all groups: the better a group’s estimate, the more weight it
should get. Nevertheless, as all the optimal weights are positive, this optimum can only be
achieved if from agent i there is a directed path into all the closed and strongly connected
groups. Notice also that the optimal weights depend on the groups’ MSEs such that an
agent in the rest of the world who is initially characterized by optimal weights would no
longer average the groups’ opinions optimally if conformity levels within the groups were
to change.
It is remarkable that an agent in the rest of the world who is connected to multiple
groups can reach a significantly lower MSE than the best informed agents from those
groups. Thus, the fact that agents in the rest of the world are absolutely powerless does
not imply that they are not wise.
6 Concluding Remarks
So far, the literature on opinion dynamics has focused on truthful opinion representation
either with a Bayesian approach (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Smith and
Sorensen, 2000; Gale and Kariv, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2011) or assuming na¨ıve updating
according to a learning matrix (DeGroot, 1974; DeMarzo et al., 2003; Golub and Jackson,
2010; Acemoglu et al., 2010). Despite some disputable assumptions in both approaches,
as Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) point out, these models serve well to study conditions
under which societies will eventually reach a state of agreement, i.e. consensus. Moreover,
in both contexts the aggregation of initial opinions may, but need not, be “asymptotically
efficient,” in the sense that social learning leads to a high accuracy of information in the
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long-run. One basic force fostering efficient information aggregation even among na¨ıve
agents is a statistical effect of growing sample size (which is also called “the wisdom of
crowds”) such as in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. On the other hand, prominent agents
or opinion leaders might reduce the accuracy of information aggregation by superseding
valuable opinions of others.
To our best knowledge, this paper is the first contribution to incorporate misrepresen-
tation of opinions. We assume that individuals depart from their true opinion by conform-
ing or counter-conforming with their peer group which is a well documented phenomenon
(Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Jones, 1984; Zafar, 2011). While we follow the literature
based on DeGroot (1974) in modeling informational social influence as na¨ıve updating of
opinions through the network, we, thus, also model normative social influence by includ-
ing conforming/counter-conforming behavior. In order to study the effects of conformity
on long-run opinions and information aggregation, we characterize sufficient conditions
for convergence and characterize the long-run opinions in this dynamic framework. When
all agents are conforming or honest, then opinions converge (Proposition 5).
Assuming convergence, we then characterize the long-run (consensus) opinion in each
closed and strongly connected group under conformity (Theorem 1). Thereby, we are in
a position to study the impact of the individual levels of conformity on opinion leader-
ship and on wisdom of the society. Opinion leaders are those whose initial opinion has a
high impact on consensus. We find that this influence is increasing in network centrality
(as in the DeGroot model), but moreover decreasing in the individual level of confor-
mity (Corollary 1). Thus, taking the network as given, we conclude that low conformity
fosters opinion leadership while high conformity undermines opinion leadership. This re-
sult is fully in line with empirical evidence that opinion leaders are characterized by a
higher inclination to “publicly individuate” themselves (Chan and Misra, 1990). There-
fore, counter-conformity might be interpreted as a persuasion device since not only the
connected agents’ opinions of next period are swayed towards own opinion but a higher
impact on the consensus opinion is achieved.
The effect of heterogeneous levels of conformity on wisdom of the society is ambiguous.
Here, wisdom is defined as the mean squared error (MSE) of the consensus opinion where
agents’ initial opinions are noisy but unbiased signals about some true state of the world
with heterogeneous signal precision. Increasing conformity of a given individual need not
undermine the wisdom of the society, but can also enhance it or leave it unchanged. We
find that increasing conformity of agents with high power and low signal precision increases
the group’s wisdom (Proposition 6). In particular, optimal wisdom within a given closed
and strongly connected group is achieved if distribution of conformity levels is such that
ratio of power over signal precision is balanced across agents (Corollary 2). This result
resembles the fact that reducing prominence of individuals – in particular prominence
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of uninformed agents – increases the accuracy of information aggregation. While in the
previous literature reduction of prominence is achieved by increasing population size (see
e.g. Golub and Jackson, 2010), in our model this can be achieved by conformity and
therefore also holds for small groups. Finally, when considering agents in the rest of the
world, we find that their levels of conformity have no influence on wisdom. Although
powerless, individuals in the rest of the world can be quite wise since they may aggregate
information from different groups.
The model presented here contains some simplifying assumptions which may be relaxed
in future research. First, we assumed that the social network is exogenous and stays
fixed over time. In the literature we can find models where the network structure may
vary over time such that only agents with “close opinions” are listened to (Hegselmann
and Krause, 2002), self confidence varies (DeMarzo et al., 2003), and general changes
are possible (Lorenz, 2005). It would be interesting to see how changes in the learning
structure, either exogenously or endogenously, affect our results. Second, we assumed
that interaction neighborhood equals observation neighborhood in the sense that agents
conform or counter-conform with those agents they listen to. If this assumption is relaxed,
the group structure may no longer be preserved and interesting applications to lobbying
(addressing a certain group) become possible. We leave these ideas and possible other
extensions to future research.
A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Expressed Opinions
Proof of Proposition 1
First, notice that s(t) by construction satisfies s(t) = (I − ∆)x(t) + ∆Y s(t) with
Y := (I − D)−1(G − D) and that for all i ∈ Aτ (t), sτi (t) is the i-th component of
(I − ∆)x(t) + ∆Y sτ−1(t). For all i ∈ Aτ (t), we therefore find sτi (t) − si(t) as the i-
th component of ∆Y (sτ−1(t)− s(t)). As Y is obviously a row-stochastic matrix, we
immediately have |sτi (t) − si(t)| ≤ δ∗||sτ−1(t) − s(t)||∞ for all i ∈ Aτ (t), with δ∗ :=
max
i∈N
|δi| < 1, while we have |sτi (t) − si(t)| = |sτ−1i (t) − si(t)| ≤ ||sτ−1(t) − s(t)||∞ for all
i 6∈ Aτ (t). Together, we therefore have that ||sτ (t) − s(t)||∞ ≤ ||sτ−1(t) − s(t)||∞ for all
τ , showing that the distance between sτ (t) and s(t) measured using the || · ||∞-norm is a
non-increasing and therefore converging sequence.
Now, let Ui(t) := {τ ∈ N : i ∈ Aτ (t)}, for each agent i. Using the assumption that
every agent i belongs almost surely to infinitely many Aτ (t), we define τ1 := min{τ ∈
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N : (∀i ∈ N )(Ui(t) ∩ {1, . . . , τ} 6= ∅)} as the first time-step where every agent has at
least once been satisfied with her stated opinion.28 Given the above, it is easy to see that
||sτ1(t)− s(t)||∞ ≤ δ∗||s0(t)− s(t)||∞. Proceeding in the same way by recursively defining
τk+1 := min{τ > τk : (∀i ∈ N )(Ui(t)∩{τk + 1, . . . , τ} 6= ∅)} as the first time-step after τk
such that all agents have at least been once satisfied with their stated opinion, we then
have ||sτk(t)− s(t)||∞ ≤ (δ∗)k||s0(t)− s(t)||∞, yielding that ||sτk(t)− s(t)||∞ and therefore
also ||sτ (t)− s(t)||∞ converges to 0.
A.2 Rewriting I-M
Lemma A.1 (I-M). I −M = (I − (G−D)∆(I −D)−1)−1 (I −G).
Proof of Lemma A.1 (I-M)
First, we can rewrite M , given by (6), to obtain
M = G− (G−D)(I −∆(I −D)−1(G−D))−1∆(I − (I −D)−1(G−D)).
This can be verified by the following calculation.
M = D + (G−D)(I −∆(I −D)−1(G−D))−1(I −∆)
= D + (G−D)[I −∆(I −D)−1(G−D)]−1[I −∆(I −D)−1(G−D)
+ ∆(I −D)−1(G−D)−∆]
= D + (G−D)(I + [I −∆(I −D)−1(G−D)]−1[∆(I −D)−1(G−D)−∆)]
= G− (G−D)[I −∆(I −D)−1(G−D)]−1∆[I − (I −D)−1(G−D)].
Thus,
I −M = I −G+ (G−D)[I −∆(I −D)−1(G−D)]−1∆(I −D)−1(I −G)
=
(
I + (G−D) [I −∆(I −D)−1(G−D)]−1 ∆(I −D)−1) (I −G). (A.1)
Now, note that for any n×m-matrix A and any m×n-matrix B, with Ik the k-dimensional
identity matrix (k ∈ {n,m}), we have that In−AB is invertible if and only if Im−BA is
invertible, and then (In−AB)−1 = In+A(Im−BA)−1B, since (In+A(Im−BA)−1B)(In−
AB) = In−AB+A(Im−BA)−1B−A(Im−BA)−1BAB = In−AB+A(Im−BA)−1(Im−
BA)B = In. Taking A = G − D and B = ∆(I − D)−1 in (A.1) then gives I −M =
(I − (G−D)∆(I −D)−1)−1 (I −G).
28The assumption that all Ui(t) are almost surely infinite guarantees that τ1, τ2, . . . are almost surely
well-defined.
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A.3 Steady states
Proof of Proposition 2
1. x is a “steady state of G,” i.e. Gx = x ⇔ (I − G)x = 0 ⇔ [I − (G − D)∆(I −
D)−1
]−1
(I −G)x = 0, since by Lemma A.1 [I − (G−D)∆(I −D)−1] is invertible.
Thus by Lemma A.1, Gx = x if and only if Mx = x.
It therefore suffices to show that Mx = x ⇒ q = x ⇒ q = s ⇒ Mx = x.
(a) x = Mx = Dx+ (G−D)s = Dx+ (I−D)q implies (I−D)x = (I−D)q, thus
q = x.
(b) q = x implies s = (I −∆)x+ ∆q = (I −∆)q + ∆q = q.
(c) q = s implies s = (I −∆)x + ∆q = (I −∆)x + ∆s and therefore (I −∆)s =
(I − ∆)x and s = q = x, from which we find Mx = Dx + (I − D)q =
Dx+ (I −D)x = x.
2. Suppose x = s. Note that s = (I −∆(I −D)−1(G−D))−1 (I − ∆)x by Proposi-
tion 1. Thus,
x = s ⇔ (I −∆(I −D)−1(G−D))x = (I −∆)x
⇔ ∆ (I − (I −D)−1(G−D))x = 0
⇔ ∆(I −D)−1 (I −D − (G−D))x = 0
(∗)⇔ (I −D)−1∆ (I −D − (G−D))x = 0
⇔ ∆ (I −G)x = 0,
where (*) holds since (I −D)−1 and ∆ are diagonal.
Lemma A.2. The following statements are equivalent:
1. True opinions x(t) converge for t→∞.
2. Stated opinions s(t) converge for t→∞.
3. Perceived opinions q(t) converge for t→∞.
Moreover, if the true, stated, and perceived opinions converge, then the limits coincide:
lim
t→∞
x(t) = lim
t→∞
s(t) = lim
t→∞
q(t).
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Proof of Lemma A.2
From Proposition 1, we get that s(t) = (I −∆(I −D)−1(G−D))−1 (I−∆)x(t). Thus
convergence of x(t) implies convergence of s(t). By definition we have that q(t) = (I −
D)−1(G−D)s(t), and hence convergence of s(t) implies convergence of q(t). To see that
convergence of q(t) implies convergence of x(t), we use that x(t + 1) = Dx(t) + (G −
D)s(t) = Dx(t) + (I −D)q(t). For all t ≥ 0, this implies x(t) = Dtx(0) +
t−1∑
l=0
Dt−1−l(I −
D)q(l), the first part of which converges to 0 because all elements of the diagonal matrix
D belong to [0, 1). The limit of x(t) therefore equals
lim
t→∞
t−1∑
l=0
Dt−1−l(I −D)q(l) = lim
t→∞
t−1∑
l=0
Dt−1−l(I −D) (q(l)− q(∞))
+ lim
t→∞
t−1∑
l=0
Dt−1−l(I −D)q(∞).
First, note that the second limit equals q(∞), because
∞∑
l=0
Dl = (I −D)−1. For the first
limit, note that for any ε > 0, we can find an index lε such that we have ||q(l)−q(∞)|| < ε
for all l > lε. Splitting the sum into small l (l ≤ lε) and large l (l > lε), we then
easily see that the first term converges to 0. Therefore, x(t) converges to q(∞). Since
s(t) = (I −∆)x(t) + ∆q(t), s(t) also shares the same limit.
A.4 Block structure
Proof of Proposition 3
Let Z := [I−∆(I−D)−1(G−D)]−1(I−∆) to simplify s = Zx and M = D+(G−D)Z.
We now proceed in three steps: we first characterize Z, then M , and finally M t. Let G be
given as in (11). Then simple but tedious block matrix algebra together with Lemma A.1
yields:
1.
Z =

Z11 0 · · · · · · 0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 ZKK 0
ZR1 · · · · · · ZRK ZRR

with
Zkk = (I −∆kk(I −Dkk)−1(Gkk −Dkk))−1(I −∆kk),
ZRk = ZRR(I −∆RR)−1∆RR(I −DRR)−1GRkZkk
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for all k = 1, . . . , K, and
ZRR = (I −∆RR(I −DRR)−1(GRR −DRR))−1(I −∆RR).
2. For M = D + (G−D)Z = I − (I − (G−D)∆(I −D)−1)−1 (I −G), we get
M =

M11 0 · · · · · · 0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 MKK 0
MR1 · · · · · · MRK MRR

with
Mkk = Dkk + (Gkk −Dkk)(I −∆kk(I −Dkk)−1(Gkk −Dkk))−1(I −∆kk)
= I − (I − (Gkk −Dkk)∆kk(I −Dkk)−1)−1 (I −Gkk),
MRk = GRkZkk + (GRR −DRR)ZRk
= (I − (GRR −DRR)∆RR(I −DRR)−1)−1GRkZkk
for all k = 1, . . . , K, and
MRR = DRR + (GRR −DRR)(I −∆RR(I −DRR)−1(GRR −DRR))−1(I −∆RR)
= I − (I − (GRR −DRR)∆RR(I −DRR)−1)−1 (I −GRR).
3. Finally, we claim that for every t ∈ N \ {0},
M t =

M t11 0 · · · · · · 0
0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 · · · 0 M tKK 0
(M t)R1 · · · · · · (M t)RK M tRR

with (M t)Rk =
t−1∑
l=0
M lRRMRkM
t−1−l
kk for all k = 1, . . . , K.
The assertion for the diagonal elements M t11, . . . ,M
t
KK and M
t
RR is trivial. We prove
the formula for M tRk by induction.
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• For t = 1, the assertion is trivial.
• t 7→ t + 1: first, we have (M t+1)Rk = (M tM)Rk = (M t)RkMkk + M tRRMRk
by simple matrix multiplication. Inserting (M t)Rk =
t−1∑
l=0
M lRRMRkM
t−1−l
kk , we
find
(M t+1)Rk =
(
t−1∑
l=0
M lRRMRkM
t−1−l
kk
)
Mkk +M
t
RRMRk
=
t+1−1∑
l=0
M lRRMRkM
t+1−1−l
kk ,
which concludes the proof.
A.5 Convergence
Proof of Proposition 4
1. ‘Only if’: this is proven in the first part of the proof of Theorem 1.
2. ‘If’: Suppose each M tkk converges and M
t
RR converges to 0. First, since M
t
kk con-
verges, its only eigenvalue with |λ| ≥ 1 is λ = 1 with algebraic and geometric
multiplicity equal to 1 for every k = 1, . . . , K. On the other hand, M tRR → 0 im-
plies that the eigenvalues of MRR are all smaller than 1 in absolute value and, thus,
MRR − λI is invertible for all complex numbers λ with |λ| ≥ 1.
Now, let the complex number λ˜ be either outside of the unit circle (|λ˜| > 1) or
exactly on the unit circle (|λ˜| = 1), but different from 1. Taking into account the
block structure of M , we easily see that any solution of (M − λ˜I)x = 0 must satisfy
x|C1 = 0, . . . , x|CK = 0, and therefore also x|CR = 0, so that we can conclude that
λ = 1 is the only possible eigenvalue of M with |λ| ≥ 1.
In order to show convergence of M t, we therefore have to show that algebraic and
geometric multiplicity of λ = 1 coincide. With regard to algebraic multiplicity, the
block structure of M implies det(M −λI) =
K∏
k=1
det(Mkk−λI) det(MRR−λI), such
that the algebraic multiplicity of λ = 1 is the sum of the algebraic multiplicities
of M11, . . . ,MKK and MRR, which are given by 1 and 0, respectively, since Mkk
is by definition irreducible for all k = 1, ..., K. Consequently, the algebraic multi-
plicity equals K. With regard to geometric multiplicity, the block structure of M
implies that for any real numbers c1, . . . , cK , the vector x of the form x|Ck = ck1|Ck
(k = 1, . . . , K) and x|CR = (I −MRR)−1
n∑
k=1
ckMRk1|Ck is an eigenvector to M for
λ = 1, implying that the geometric multiplicity is at least K, thereby concluding
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the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5
Denote Y := (I − D)−1(G − D) which is row stochastic. Thus, as |δi| < 1 for all
i ∈ N , we have that I − ∆Y is invertible and (I −∆Y )−1 = ∑∞k=0(∆Y )k. Moreover, if
δi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N , the sum
∑∞
k=0(∆Y )
k is a sum of non-negative matrices, implying
that (I−∆Y )−1 has only non-negative entries. Hence M = D+(G−D)[I−∆Y ]−1(I−∆)
is non-negative since it is the product of non-negative matrices (since 0 < gii < 1) added
to D, which is a diagonal matrix with strictly positive entries (0 < gii). Finally, since
M1 = 1 by Lemma A.1, we get that M is row stochastic. Since the diagonal of D is
strictly positive, we get that the diagonal of M is strictly positive, mii > 0, implying
aperiodicity of M . Thus M t converges.
A.6 Long–run
To prove Theorem 1, the following Lemma is helpful.
Lemma A.3 (Convergence to Eigenvector). Let A be an n× n-matrix with A1 = 1 and
rk(I −A) = n− 1. If At converges to A∞ for t→∞, then A∞ = 1w′, with w′ the unique
normalized left eigenvector of A associated with the eigenvalue 1.
Proof of Lemma A.3
Obviously, AA∞ = A∞ = A∞A. This implies that
• the columns of A∞ must be multiples of 1,
• the rows of A∞ must be multiples of w′,
from which we find A∞ = r 1w′ for some real number r which is found to be equal to 1
as 1 = A∞1 = r 1w′1 = r 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
We first derive the formula for M∞kk . Then we will turn to M
∞
RR and M
∞
Rk.
Assume for the moment that rk(I −G) = n− 1. Then, as v′(M − I) = 0, we have due
to Lemma A.1
0 = v′(I −M) = v′ (I − (G−D)∆(I −D)−1)−1 (I −G),
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implying
v′
(
I − (G−D)∆(I −D)−1)−1 = r w′
for some real number r. Using w′G = w′, we then find
v′ = r w′
(
I − (G−D)∆(I −D)−1) = r w′ (I − (I −D)∆(I −D)−1) = r w′(I −∆).
The normalization of v then entails r = 1
w′(I−∆)1 , which shows that v =
(I −∆)w
1
′(I −∆)w .
Now, relaxing the assumption rk(I −G) = n− 1, the formula for M∞kk follows.
Furthermore, MM∞x = M∞x and therefore due to Proposition 2, GM∞x = M∞x
for all n-dimensional vectors x, delivering GM∞ = M∞. This implies
• M∞RR = GRRM∞RR and therefore (I − GRR)M∞RR = 0, entailing M∞RR = 0 because
I −GRR is invertible,
• M∞Rk = GRkM∞kk +GRRM∞Rk, and therefore M∞Rk = (I −GRR)−1GRkM∞kk .
A.7 Wisdom
Proof of Lemma 1
First, µˆk is easily seen to be unbiased for µ because
∑
i∈Ck
vi = 1. Therefore, its MSE
equals its variance which is given by
∑
i∈Ck
v2i σ
2
i as the xi(0) are uncorrelated.
Proof of Proposition 6
∂MSEk
∂δi
=
∂
∑
j∈Ck
v2jσ
2
j
∂δi
=
∑
j∈Ck
2σ2j vj
∂vj
∂δi
(17)
=
2wi∑
j∈Ck
wj(1− δj)
∑
j∈Ck
σ2j vj (vj − 1j=i) .
The assertion follows easily noting that MSEk =
∑
j∈Ck
vjvjσ
2
j .
Proof of Proposition 7 First, notice that E((xi(∞) − µ)2) =
K∑
k=1
γ2i,k MSEk, with
K∑
k=1
γi,k = 1 for all i ∈ R. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
1 =
K∑
k=1
γi,k =
K∑
k=1
(
γi,k
√
MSEk
) 1√
MSEk
≤
√√√√ K∑
k=1
γ2i,k MSEk
√√√√ K∑
k=1
1
MSEk
,
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with equality if and only if there exists some (necessarily positive) constant a such that
γi,k
√
MSEk = a
1√
MSEk
for all k. We therefore have
K∑
k=1
γ2i,k MSEk ≥ 1K∑
k=1
1
MSEk
, with equality
if and only if γi,k =
1
MSEk
K∑
l=1
1
MSEl
for all k.
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